Introduction
Philosophical discussions of what sorts of things exist (ontology) 1 now recognize that many types of entities that played important roles in the science of earlier historical periods in fact never existed. This raises the troubling suggestion that some (perhaps many) of the entities invoked by present-day scientists may also be figments. John Worrall (1989) suggested that structural aspects of science persist even when ontological commitments change. He holds objects that scientists talk about do exist, but that they have unknowable natures -this has been called "epistemological structural realism"
(ESR) (Ladyman 2001) . Others (French and Ladyman 2003) hold that objects scientists discuss do not exist -but, paradoxically, their structures exist. This is "ontic structural realism" (OSR). This view seems consistent (Earley 2006 ) with Eddington's (1939 147) manifesto:
What sort of thing is it that I know? The answer is structure. To be quite precise, it is structure of the kind defined and investigated by the mathematical theory of groups.
Some scientists whose laboratory research deals with time-dependent phenomena (including Professor Stein and me) find Whitehead's cosmological scheme to be a useful 1 Ontological questions were out of fashion in American philosophy for several decades. That situation has changed. Hilary Putnam (2005 2) traces the revival of ontology (a mistake, in his opinion) to W. V. Quine's (1948) paper, "On What There
Is."
J. E. Earley January 28, 2006
2 approach to ontological questions. However, complications arise in constructing an applicable process ontology. This paper outlines some of these challenges, and sketches a neo-Whiteheadian ontological scheme -here called process structural realism (PSR) 2 .
Navigating between the Sandbar and the Rock
Some philosophers adopt a relaxed ontology, exemplified by Justus Buchler's (1966 31 ) notion of "natural complex."
Whatever is discriminated in any way (whether it is "encountered" or produced or otherwise related to) is a natural complex, and no complex is more "real" or more "genuine" or more ultimate than any other.
Da Costa and French (2003) have shown that scientists commonly operate with a complex and pragmatic notion of "truth." Scientific statements may be regarded as "true for present purposes" or "true so far as it goes." In this connection, these authors discuss formal characteristics of "quasi-truth" and "partial truth." Nevertheless, specific ontological commitments, expressed or implied, seem necessary for serious philosophy.
For example, the notion that explanation must ultimately rest on a level of submicroscopic "elementary" (i.e., simple) constituents has been a presupposition (often unstated) of much philosophy of science. Weyl (1949 86) gave a clear statement of this position:
Only in the infinitely small may we expect to encounter the elementary and uniform laws, hence the world must be comprehended through its behavior in the infinitely small.
Arguably, the first half of the twentieth century was the golden age of this kind of explanation through reduction. 
Is There an Ontological Criterion?
According to Whitehead ([1929 Whitehead ([ ] 1978 'Actual entities' -also termed 'actual occasions'-are the final real things of which the world is made up. involves "ingression" of some "eternal object" -a "form of definiteness" that serves as a "subjective aim" to regulate whether "data" provided by the antecedent world are "prehended" positively (integrated into the concresent occasion) or negatively (excluded from the concrescence). A major distinction between Whiteheadian actual occasions and Buchlerian natural complexes might well be that a defining eternal object is necessary in the former case but not in the latter. Neville (e.g., 2003) has pointed out that each existing thing has two aspectsdistinguishable but related. These are the aspect of internal coherence and the aspect of external efficacy -called the "cosmological" and "epistemological" aspects, respectively. If an eternal object were necessary for each actual occasion, then that necessity would be a "cosmological" feature of each occasion. The "Eleatic Principle"
(also known as "Alexander's Dictum") specifies what would be an epistemological difference between the two categories.
…. everything that we postulate to exist should make some sort of contribution to the causal/nomic order of the world. (Armstrong 2004, 37) . Merricks (2001 Merricks ( , 2003 proposed an important clarification of that principle:
… every material object not only has causal powers, but has nonredundant causal powers. …For material objects to be is to have nonredundant causal powers.
The causal powers of a Buchlerian natural complex might well be redundant -just the 3 Quotation marks enclose terms used in technical senses on their first use. Unless a different definition is given, the meaning intended is that used for that term elsewhere in this volume. Whitehead rejected the category of substance. 4 Whiteheadian actual occasions do not persist; they come to be and, as they do, they perish. However, Whitehead ([1933 206) recognized that some combinations of actual entities ("societies with personal order") do have careers through time.
The Universe achieves its values by reason of its coordination into societies of societies, and societies of societies of societies.
Process ontology needs to deal with the question of how it is possible that many actual occasions could constitute a society that occupies time -though the constituent occasions do not persist.
In summary, any adequate application of Whiteheadian concepts to topics of interest to chemists, other scientists, and the world at large, should have three features. It must avoid the reductionist illusion (that there is some single privileged fundamental level of description). This requires an explicitly multi-level ontology. Process ontology also should reject Buchlerian ontological promiscuity by elucidating how eternal objects (forms of definiteness) ground entities at each ontological level. In addition, it ought to clarify the relationship of process and substance while elucidating ontic causality that fulfills the extended Eleatic Principle.
Parts, and Two Types of Wholes
Mereology is a branch of logic that sets out to deal with wholes and parts. As David Lewis (1999 1) puts it:
Mereology is the theory of the relation of part to whole, and kindred notions. One of the kindred notions is that of a mereological fusion, or sum: the whole composed of some given parts. … The fusion of all cats is that large, scattered chunk of cat-stuff which is composed of all the cats there are and nothing else. It has all cats as parts.
Lewis routinely applies mereology to physical and biological systems (especially cats) but his main concern is with the foundations of mathematics. Some recent philosophical discussions of the constitution of material objects stand "in the tradition of Russell, Quine, and Lewis" (Barnett 2004 , Wasserman 2004 . Sider (2004) considered persistence through time from a related viewpoint.
When mereologists speak of "whole" they do not use the term in its usual English meaning, but rather in a specific technical sense with a meaning close to Buchler's natural complex. Wimstatt (2000) found that quite special conditions are necessary for the existence of the merely aggregative summation behavior that standard mereology assumes to be a general characteristic of what it calls wholes (fusions). Standard mereology considers that parts in fusions are the very same entities that existed prior to fusion. In contrast, chemical combination invariably causes significant changes in the entities that enter combination (Earley 2005) . The notion of composition generally used by mereologists has little relevance for matters of interest to chemists or other scientists.
A quite different notion of a whole -one that is closer to the dictionary definition of that word -seems more relevant to chemistry, and to philosophical problems other than the basis of mathematics. In an early paper, Rescher and Oppenheim (1955) proposed three requirements for a composite individual to constitute a whole in this second sense.
[1] … The whole must possess some attribute of its status as a wholean attribute peculiar to it and characteristic of it as a whole. … [2] The parts must stand in some special and characteristic relationship of dependence with one another; they must satisfy some special condition in virtue of their status as parts of a whole….
[3] The whole must posses some kind of structure, in virtue of which certain specifically structural
J. E. Earley January 28, 2006
7 characteristics pertain to it.
[See also Rescher (1955) ]. If the attribute of its status as a whole should be some sort of relationship with external entities, then the whole, as a unit, may satisfy the Eleatic Principle and have ontological significance. This notion of whole seems closely related to Millikan's (2000) notion of substance (Earley forthcoming).
Nature abounds in individual entities that qualify as wholes in this second sense.
Biological individuals of many types immediately come to mind. 5 Clearly biological organisms are composed of parts, but individual biological organisms persist (in some sense) through many alterations of their components. This paper considers three examples of effective aggregation related to biology: virus capsids, swarms of organisms, and cyclical reaction networks.
Virus Capsids
Viruses are non-living aggregates of molecules (mostly proteins and nucleic acids). That disease event killed more people than had died in the World War of 1914-1918. 7 There are six five-fold axes of rotational symmetry, ten three-fold axes, and fifteen arises from shielding of parts of the protein molecules from solvent water in the interior of the capsid. This nonlocal attraction just balances the repulsion between the protein molecules due to electrical charges. These two forces are of only modest strength (Kegel 2004) . The resulting structure is more flexible than structures that involve higher energies (e.g, most solids). Protein capsids constitute "soft condensed matter."
Swarms of Organisms
Biological individuals often coordinate their activities in large aggregations. This happens when many thousands of free-living Dictyostelium discoideum amoebas spontaneously coalesce to produce a single slug that moves (as a unit) to a favorable two-fold axes. dominate -a force attracts members into the aggregation, and a countervailing interaction opposes crowding in the swarm. The attractive force falls off with distance but is otherwise "non-local" -it does not depend on the detailed arrangement of individuals.
The repulsive force is "local" -it depends on the distance between each individual and its near neighbors. The properties of the swarm follow from the balance of these two forces. This situation is analogous to the balance of forces in the capsid of the viruses.
However, the spatial structure of the swarm is generally less regular and is subject to larger variation than is the spatial structure of the capsid.
Cycles of Chemical Reactions
Normally, chemical processes slow down as they proceed. Some chemical reactions (called autocatalytic) become more rapid as they go on. One way to achieve autocatalysis is through a molecule that generates copies of itself (for instance, by acting as a template). This type of autocatalytic reaction is common in biology -in nucleic acid replication, for instance. Providing a plausible basis for the evolution of this 'direct' autocatalysis has been a major focus of origin-of-life research. Regrettably, scenarios that emerge from such research require that significant evolutionary development necessarily requires events in which many independent factors have quite special properties. Such highly constrained transitions are improbable. Some cyclical chemical reaction networks 10 It is not necessary to mention related human behaviors.
11
English has many collective nouns (e.g., school, herd, gaggle, mob, …) that apply to specific types of such aggregations. This paper uses the generic term swarm for all of them.
12
The detailed nature of each of these two forces varies from species to species. 
Process Structural Realism (PSR)
Everything that is ontologically significant must be definite -but nothing persists without change:
One all-pervasive fact, inherent in the very character of what is real, is the transition of things, the passage one to another. This passage is not a mere linear procession of discrete entities. However we fix a determinate entity, there is always a narrower determination of something which is presupposed in our first choice. Also there is always a wider determination into which our first choice fades by transition beyond itself. The general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary expansiveness. These unities, which I call events, are the emergence into actuality of something. How are we to characterize the something which thus emerges? The name 'event' given to such a unity, draws attention to the inherent transitoriness, combined with the actual unity. …. 'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. … Realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value. But there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The definite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment; apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness. (Whitehead [1925 The three examples considered (aggregation of protein molecules into virus capsids, coalescence of biological individuals into swarms, closure of chemical reactions into cycles) all concern development of persistent coherences of individuals that are capable of independent existence ("societies," in Whitehead's vocabulary). However, those aggregations also are parts of more-inclusive coherences. The virus capsid is essential to the parasitic cycle of the virus, and depends on that cycle for its own reproduction. constituted by a closed cycle of reactions, each circuit of the cyclical path constitutes one actual occasion. 16 In homogeneous media, the cycle of reactions would not involve spatial structure.
17
In one sense, the causal powers of each of the three aggregates considered here are indeed just the powers of the constituents "acting in concert" (Merricks 2001 ).
Ontologically significant non-redundancy arises from the fact that the components act in concert only because of their inclusion in the coherence. In all three examples, the form of definiteness that provides the internal coherence (a cosmological aspect) also grounds the external efficacy (epistemological aspect) of the societal aggregation. This is a structural feature of each coherence -possibly, but not necessarily, apparent in spatial structuring.
Whitehead vigorously attacked the notion that basic entities have "simple location" -unique, precise, and unambiguous situations in what we now call four-dimensional spacetime (Whitehead [1925 . Taking this attack seriously implies recognition that the idea that actual occasions have no temporal duration is a high abstraction (Earley 1995) . Early interpreters may or may not have been correct in their conclusion that
Whitehead himself intended to hold that the "final real things" are all submicroscopic.
Whether or not Whitehead held it, the doctrine a submicroscopic level of unique 16 Inquiry as to a specific beginning or end of such a cycle would be misplaced concreteness of high order (Earley 1993) .
If diffusion were important, spatial structure could result.
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significance is quite inconsistent with the science of the twenty-first century. We now recognize that what is fundamental is achievement of effective coherence. The level of size on which that achievement occurs may have little importance.
Combinations of molecules, of biological individuals, or of chemical processes can produce effects that are not simply attributable to the constituents. Such non-redundant causality warrants recognition of those coherences as ontologically significant whenever that efficacy is relevant. 18 With respect to such interaction, the effective coherence is more real than are the components. This ontological view is, I submit, a variety of structural realism and is also a kind of process philosophy. The designation 'process structural realism' (PSR) seems appropriate.
18
In all cases, whether or not a specific coherence is ontologically significant depends on the detailed characteristics of entities with which that coherence interacts (Earley 2003c) . 
